A broadcast encryption (BE) scheme is a method for encrypting messages in a way that only a set of privileged users can decrypt it. Anonymity in a BE system is to hide any information on the privileged set. This problem has very recently had some attention and some constructions are proposed to achieve anonymity. However, anonymity in a trace and revoke (TR) scheme has not been studied yet, and to the best of our knowledge there is no construction for an anonymous TR system. In this paper, we present a generic transformation from an anonymous BE scheme into an anonymous TR scheme.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption (BE) is introduced in [1] and later studied in [2, 3] . 1 With such systems it is possible to encrypt to any chosen set of privileged users while the others (called revoked users) are precluded from the reception of the message.
A coalition of malicious users (called traitors) may use their legitimate keys to produce a pirate decryption box (called the pirate decoder) that is made available to unintended parties. Traitor tracing (TT) systems are employed [4, 5] to deter users from involving in this type of piracy.
It is desired to integrate both revocation and tracing functionalities in a single system. However, combining these two features is not always easy as pointed in [6] [7] [8] . A non-trivial construction, called a trace and revoke scheme (TR), is proposed by Naor and Pinkas in [9] . Later, Naor et al. [6] proposed a TR scheme which employs a weaker tracing strategy that focuses on disabling the pirate decoder rather than identifying traitors. Yet this strategy has been shown to have its own weakness, called pirate evolution [10] . Other successful TR systems proposed so far include [7, 11] .
A common shortcoming of all the systems above is that the anonymity of the privileged set is not preserved in the ciphertext. Despite its importance, anonymity for BE schemes has not been considered until [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Barth et al. [12] construct an anonymous BE scheme that is secure in the random oracle model by employing a key-private (i.e., ciphertexts do not leak public key information) IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme. Fazio and Perera [13] propose an outsider anonymous BE scheme where the identities are hidden only from unauthorized users (outsiders).
A recent work by Libert et al. [15] achieves IND-CCA2 anonymity. A lower bound due to the size of the description of the privileged set is also provided. Kiayias and Samari [14] later improved this lower bound by showing that the number of encryptions in an anonymous BE scheme has to be at least linear in the length of the privileged set.
Anonymity of a TR scheme has not been studied yet, and to the best of our knowledge there is no anonymous TR system. In this paper, we present a generic transformation of an anonymous BE scheme into an anonymous TR scheme. The transformation preserves the public and private key sizes of the underlying scheme and expands the ciphertext length by a factor of two in the worst case.
When we apply our transformation to the anonymous BE schemes of Libert et al. [15] (which are in fact IND-CCA2 secure), we obtain a fully anonymous TR scheme with the same efficiency performance of [15] but our transformation inherits IND-CCA1 security rather than IND-CCA2. Another instantiation with [13] leads to a TR scheme with a weaker type of anonymity, called outsider-anonymity, while achieving a ciphertext length of O(s) where s is the size of the privileged set.
Preliminaries

Anonymous broadcast encryption
A BE scheme consists of three algorithms: (1) KeyDist(1 n ) generates private keys sk i : i ∈ [n] (throughout the paper we will denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n]) and a public key PK . In such schemes, even if all revoked users in [n]\S collude to decrypt a ciphertext intended for the set S, they should not be able to get any useful information about the message. This confidentiality feature is formalized below in Game 1 (see [2, 3] ).
Game 1 IND-CCA1 confidentiality game for BE schemes.
1: Initialize. The challenger C runs ({sk i } i∈ [n] , PK ) ← KeyDist(1 n ) and sends PK to a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A.
2: Query Phase. A can corrupt polynomially many users, denoted by set R, and capture the keys {sk i } i∈R . A CCA1 adversary can also make polynomially many decryption queries (i, c) to which the challenger C responds with Decrypt(PK , sk i , c). Throughout the paper, we say an adversary playing a security game (e.g. In an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme, the adversary should be unable to distinguish between any two equalsized sets of privileged users as long as the corrupted users do not cover the symmetric difference of the two sets. Following the terminology of [14] , we define ANO-CCA1 anonymity via the following Game 2.
Game 2 ANO-CCA1 anonymity game for BE schemes. 1: Initialize. The challenger C runs ({sk i } i∈ [n] , PK ) ← KeyDist(1 n ) and sends PK to a PPT adversary A. 2: Query Phase. A can corrupt polynomially many users, denoted by set R, and captures the keys {sk i } i∈R . A CCA1 adversary can also make polynomially many decryption queries (i, c) to which the challenger C responds with Decrypt(PK , sk i , c).
Challenge. A provides a message m and two equal-sized sets S 0 , S 1 which satisfy 
Definition 2.
A BE scheme B is priv-eq ANO-CCA1 secure if Adv A is negligible for any PPT adversary A playing Game 2.
More generally, we define a BE scheme B to be priv-full ANO-CCA1 secure if the challenge sets can be any two subsets of [n].
Trace and revoke scheme
A trace and revoke (TR) scheme is a multiuser encryption system that supports both revocation (as in BE) and piracy detection (as in traitor tracing schemes). In this paper, we consider an adversarial setting where the adversary corrupts a number of user keys (that we call traitor keys) and produces a pirate decoder which succeeds in decrypting ciphertexts intended for at least one subset. If the set S (or distribution over sets) for which the decoder works with non-negligible probability is infeasible to sample then it is straightforward that no tracing can take place: given the infeasibility of sampling, the tracer will fail to ever witness the decoder to work. Due to this impossibility, in the below we will assume (as is also assumed by previous works of [7, 11] ) without loss of generality that a set S, for which a non-negligible probability of successful decryption holds, is known to the tracer. Note that this necessary assumption is quite reasonable in practice as well: typically the set S is selected by the distribution center and it is entirely outside the control of the pirate. We denote a pirate decoder that is capable of correctly decrypting broadcasts to set S (i.e. ciphertexts generated by Encrypt(PK , S, m)) by D S which can be modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm.
Throughout the paper, we consider D S to be perfect, i.e., it decrypts the ciphertexts generated by Encrypt(PK , S, m) with probability 1. An imperfect decoder can be dealt with employing δ-robust Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting codes of [4] , which will not be elaborated further in this paper.
In addition to the three algorithms of a BE scheme, it is equipped with a tracing algorithm Trace which gets as input a pirate decoder D S that is produced by a PPT adversary corrupting a set of users T with |T | ≤ t. Trace outputs a user u who has contributed in the construction of the pirate decoder D S . We say the algorithm succeeds if u ∈ T holds, i.e. Trace(S, D S , PK ) ∈ T where D S is produced by using the traitor keys {sk i } i∈T .
In this paper, we consider black-box tracing where decoders cannot be reverse engineered and the keys inside cannot be revealed directly. In this setting, the Trace algorithm has black-box access to the pirate decoder, i.e., it is only allowed to query with ciphertexts and observe the way the decoder responds. The pirate decoders are also assumed to be resettable (does not maintain state during tracing) and available (remains available as long as the tracing process continues). In the literature, almost all of the positive results in designing traitor tracing schemes (including the schemes that we compare to our constructions) are successful against such decoders.
Since a TR scheme is a BE scheme with a tracing procedure and tracing is not relevant to IND-CCA1 security and anonymity, we do not need to define IND-CCA1 security and anonymity for TR schemes separately. They are inherited from their BE counterparts. We need one new security definition for TR schemes regarding tracing capability, which we state as follows.
Definition 3.
We say T is a TR scheme against a coalition T of t traitors, if, given a PPT pirate decoder D S forged by T , the PPT Trace algorithm of T succeeds to find a traitor index with non-negligible probability.
Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code
The Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code, a pair of ⟨CodeGen, Identify⟩ algorithms, plays a crucial role in our generic construction. Due to the lack of space, only a brief description will be presented here which would be sufficient to follow and check the correctness and traceability of our construction. For a complete discussion on the Boneh-Shaw code, we refer the reader to [16] .
The CodeGen algorithm of the Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code works as follows: a binary matrix of n by nd is formed Finally, a permutation π over the columns of the matrix is applied as shown above. The rows of the resulting matrix constitute the codewords of the (ℓ, n)-code with length ℓ = nd. We say a piracy has occurred if a pirate codeword p ∈ {0, 1} ℓ is produced from some codewords (we call them traitor codewords). The pirate codeword is produced under a marking assumption, which essentially says if all traitor codewords have 0 (or 1) in a particular column, the corresponding column of the pirate codeword must be 0 (resp. 1) as well.
The Identify algorithm of Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code is given a pirate codeword p and it returns a row-index which is supposed to be the index of a traitor codeword. The secrecy of the permutation π is crucial for the correctness of the code. We say the code is (ϵ, t)-identifier if Identify algorithm identifies a traitor regardless of the traitor strategy upon observation of a pirate codeword produced by a coalition of t traitors.
Generic transformation
In this section, we show how to transform an anonymous BE scheme into an anonymous TR scheme. A message is broadcasted for a privileged set S as follows: first S is partitioned into P = {S 0 , S 1 } and the message is encrypted for each subset S 0 , S 1 separately using the BE scheme. This transformation preserves the revocation capability of the underlying BE scheme.
Let B be an anonymous BE scheme consisting of three algorithms BKeyDist, BEncrypt, and BDecrypt. We design the algorithms of our generic scheme T as follows. Our tracing algorithm follows a similar tracing strategy of the works by [4, 8, 17] . Fixing a particular partition P = {S 0 , S 1 } of set S = S 0 ∪ S 1 , two types of tracing ciphertext are constructed: in type (P, (PK B , S 1 , m) ; in type (P, 1)c 0 is changed to be an encryption of a random message m r .
Note that the message m can be retrieved by all privileged users in the tracing transmission of type (P, 0). If a tracing transmission of type (P, 1) is decryptable by the pirate decoder D S (that is constructed by a traitor coalition T ) with probability greater than 1/2, then we conclude the existence of a traitor in set S 1 . Otherwise, we observe a substantial gap (greater than 1/2 success probability drop) in the behavior of the decoder for tracing transmissions of type (P, 0) and (P, 1) which suggests that a traitor exists in set S 0 .
We extend the above basic strategy into a full-fledged tracing algorithm for our generic construction. Toward this goal, we will simulate the random partitions of the TEncrypt algorithm by employing a Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } of length ℓ. is indistinguishable from a random split of the set S.
Fixing the permutation π , we query the pirate decoder with tracing ciphertexts of types (P π ,j , 0), (P π ,j , 1) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. Based on the success probability of the pirate decoder in decrypting those ciphertexts we conclude the existence of a traitor in either set S j,0 or set S j,1 and further produce a pirate codeword w (we denote the jth bit by w j ): we set w j = 1 if a traitor exists in set S j,1 and set w j = 0 otherwise. We argue that the pirate codeword would be in the descendant set of the codewords available to the user-set T π = {π (u) : u ∈ T }, i.e. if w j = b then S j,b ∩ T π ̸ = ∅ holds. The correctness of this argument can be trivially checked and will be elaborated later in Section 4. Finally, the Identify algorithm of the Boneh-Shaw code, on input w, will identify a user index t from set T π , i.e. π −1 (t) would be a traitor-index involved in the production of the pirate decoder.
• Trace(S, D S , PK T ) first parses PK B from PK T . It produces a Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } ← CodeGen(1 n ), initializes a pirate codeword w ← 0 ℓ and chooses a permutation π . Denoting the length of the code C by ℓ, it creates partitions P π,j = {S j,0 , , S j,1 , m) . We say that the pirate decoder D S succeeds in decrypting tracing ciphertext of type (P π,j , 1) if it returns m. The success probability of D S denoted by p j,1 is approximated. We set w j = 1 if p j,1 ≥ 1/2 and set w j = 0 otherwise. By repeating the above for j ∈ [ℓ], we produce a pirate codeword w and compute t ← Identify(w) for which π −1 (t)
would be a traitor-index involved in the production of the pirate decoder. 3 Deciding a valid decryption, i.e. applying a wrong key to a ciphertext results to a special fail message to be returned requires some sort of strong correctness property which is assumed for our construction in this paper. Motivating further exploration in this quest, a possible solution can be achieved e.g. by appending a value H(m) (where H is a hash function) to the plaintext m; we omit further details.
The difference between G 0 and G 1 is replacing BEncrypt(PK , We take one step ahead and create a new game, denoted by G 2 , where we set c *
Through a sequence of games, we will show that b = 0 case in game G T (denoted by G T 0 ) is indistinguishable from b = 1 case (denoted by G T 1 ). Let G 0 be a new game almost identical to the game G T 0 where, in addition, a random partition S 1 = S 1,0 ∪ S 1,1 is also computed for the subset S 1 . This partition will be a conditionally random split strictly bounded by the following equalities:
Since the partition of the set S 1 is not used in the challenge, a direct reduction from game G 0 to the game G T 0 is trivially available.
We define a new game G 1 which is almost identical to G 0 : instead of preparing the challenge ciphertext for the subsets Since both of these subsets do not intersect with subset S 0,0 , an adversary distinguishing these two games can be turned into an adversary (through standard ways which are omitted due to the lack of space) which is capable of breaking the priv-eq ANO-CCA1 security of the BE scheme.
We take a another step and define a new game G 2 which is almost identical to G 1 : instead of preparing the challenge ciphertext for the subsets S 0,0 and S 1,1 , a pair of encryption (c * 1,0 , c * 1,1 ) is produced for the subsets S 1,0 and S 1,1 . Similarly, these two games are indistinguishable with respect to our priv-eq ANO-CCA1 security assumption of the BE scheme.
In all these three games G 0 , G 1 and G 2 , a conditionally random split (those conditions are listed above) for S 1 is computed after a random split for S 0 is chosen. In our final game G 3 , we change this order: we first compute a random split for S 1 and later a random split for S 0 satisfying the equations/conditions stated above. Since the challenge ciphertexts of game G 2 and G 3 are independent from the partition of S 0 , a conditionally random split of S 1 in game G 2 would be indistinguishable from a random split of S 1 in game G 3 . Since the partition of the set S 0 is not used in the challenge, a direct reduction from game G T 1 to the game G 3 is trivially available. Hence, the success probability of an adversary winning in game G T is bounded with the advantage of breaking the anonymity of the BE scheme. Proof. In order to prove this lemma, we will show that the tracing algorithm of T succeeds (i.e. detects a traitor) against any resettable and available pirate decoder D S constructed by a coalition of size at most t, with a probability 1 − ϵ f − ℓϵ by using an (ϵ f , t)-identifier Boneh-Shaw code with codeword length ℓ, where ϵ is a negligible probability that can arbitrarily be decreased by increasing the number of experiments in the tracing procedure. The tracing process can be considered as three stages: approximating the success probability of the decoder in decrypting tracing ciphertexts, producing the pirate codeword w, and finally identifying a traitor index.
Lemma 3 (Traceability
We would like to first argue that the tracing partitions and the regular partitions are chosen from the same distribution . . , c n } of length ℓ is a fingerprinting code that is produced by running CodeGen(1 n ) algorithm of Boneh-Shaw code. The random choice of the permutation π and the choice of j makes the tracing partition of type (π , j) indistinguishable (a full proof is omitted due to the lack of space) from a random split of the set S.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the tracing stages, let us introduce some notation: we call the number of approximation queries by λ, the expected number of times the decoder succeeds in decrypting tracing ciphertext of type (P π ,j , b) is denoted by µ j,b = λ · σ j,b and the actual number of successes during the approximation process is denoted by ρ j,b = λ · p j,b where σ j,b and p j,b are defined as the success probabilities respectively.
Approximation phase: due to the allowed resettability of the decoder after each tracing query, we can keep the same permutation π fixed throughout tracing process. Applying a two-tailed form of the Chernoff bound (since the consecutive tracing experiments are independent due to resettability), for the choice of λ = 48 ln(2/ϵ), we obtain |ρ j,1 − µ j,1 | ≥ λ/4 with probability at most ϵ.
Substituting α = λ/4 and λ = 48 ln(2/ϵ) we obtain 2e −α 2 /3λ = 2e
Conclusion: |ρ j,1 − µ j,1 | ≤ λ/4, which is equivalent of saying |p j,1 − σ j,1 | ≤ 1/4, holds with probability at least 1 − ϵ. Pirate codeword generation: we now prove that w is in the descendent set of the codewords available to the user-set T π = {π (u) : u ∈ T } with high probability: i.e., for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, if w j = b then S j,b ∩ T π ̸ = ∅ for b ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the case w j = 0: due to the tracing strategy this can happen only when p j,1 < 1/2 holds. Assume the contradiction of our claim that is S j,0 ∩ T π = ∅, i.e. there exists no traitor in S j,0 . Since we consider only perfect decoders it holds that σ j,0 = p j,0 = 1. It further holds that |σ j,1 − p j,1 | ≤ 1/4 with probability at least 1 − ϵ due to approximation.
Replacing all these into the following triangular inequality |σ j,0 − σ j,1 | + |σ j,1 − p j,1 | ≥ |σ j,0 − p j,1 |, we obtain |σ j,0 − σ j,1 | ≥ 1/4. This suggests that the pirate decoder is capable of distinguishing the tracing ciphertexts of type (P π ,j , 0) from (P π ,j , 1) with probability at least 1/4, hence distinguishing whether a random message or the actual message is broadcasted to the set S j,0 . Since our contradiction assumption states that S j,0 ∩ T π = ∅, we can use such capability of the pirate decoder to break the IND-CCA1 security claim of the scheme B. Thus we end up with a contradiction.
Consider now the case w j = 1, so does p j,1 ≥ 1/2: following the similar analysis we obtain σ j,1 ≥ 1/4 with probability at least 1 − ϵ. Under the security assumptions of the underlying BE scheme, we conclude that there should exist a traitor in set S j,1 .
The above is repeated for all j values. Applying the union probability over the choices of j, we conclude that the constructed pirate codeword is in the descendent set of traitors with probability at least 1 − ℓϵ.
Traitor identification. Finally, Identify(w) algorithm of Boneh-Shaw returns a traitor index with probability at least 1 − ϵ f . This completes the proof of the traceability. The overall failure probability of accusing an innocent user is bounded by ϵ f + ℓϵ (for the failures in identification and approximations, respectively) for the given parameters.
